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COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
John Krahmer*ON July 1, 2001, the law of secured transactions was substantially
changed when revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code became effective in Texas and in forty-five other states.,
While this is the most significant event affecting the subject of commer-
cial transactions during the Survey period, it will be some time before
cases are reported that interpret and apply the revision. In the meantime,
however, a number of cases were decided under other provisions of the
Code that are not affected by the revision and these are discussed below.
As usual, the discussion follows the organization of the Texas Business
and Commerce Code (the "Code"). 2
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
A. CHOICE OF LAW
Cases arising under the Code are governed by choice of law rules con-
tained in the Code itself and not by the choice of law rules that might be
applied to non-Code disputes.3 This principle was recognized in In re
* Professor of Law and Foundation Professor of Commercial Law, Texas Tech Uni-
versity. B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; LL.M., Harvard University.
1. Revised Article 9 was adopted in Texas during the 1999 legislative session to be-
come effective on July 1, 2001. See Act of June 18, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 414, § 1.01,
1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 2639. Several technical amendments were made during the 2001 legis-
lative session, but the effective date remained the same. See Act of June 13, 2001, 77th
Leg., R.S., ch. 705, §§ 1-26 (codified as TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.101 -.709
(Vernon Supp. 2002).
Enactments in other jurisdictions are collected in the Uniform Commercial Code Re-
porting Service, State U.C.C. Variations Table, pp. xxv-xxvi (2001). Four other states also
adopted the revision, but with changes in the effective date. In Connecticut the effective
date was October 1, 2001. In Alabama, Florida, and Mississippi, the effective date was
January 1, 2002.
2. In Texas, the Uniform Commercial Code comprises the first eleven chapters of the
Texas Business and Commerce Code (the "Code"). See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§§ 1.101-11.108 (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 2000). These chapters are designated as follows:
Chapter 1: General Provisions
Chapter 2: Sales
Chapter 2A: Leases
Chapter 3: Negotiable Instruments
Chapter 4: Bank Deposits and Collections
Chapter 4A: Funds Transfers
Chapter 5: Letters of Credit
Chapter 7: Warehouse Receipts, Bills of Lading and Other Documents of
Title
Chapter 8: Investment Securities
Chapter 9: Secured Transactions
3. See, e.g., Admiral Ins. Co. v. Brinkcraft Dev., Ltd., 921 F.2d 591, 592 (5th Cir.
1991) (noting that separate standards apply to Code cases and to common law cases); Da-
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Kemper,4 where the court held that a series of promissory notes properly
selected Texas law because the notes were "negotiable instruments"
under the Code and the transactions bore a "reasonable relationship" to
Texas.5 The court rejected an argument that Florida and Nevada had
"more significant contacts" with the transactions because section 1.105(a)
of the Code only requires a reasonable relationship and not "the most
significant" relationship with a given state.6 Applying substantive Texas
law, the court held an issue of material fact existed as to whether the
payment of "consulting fees" required under the notes was actually a de-
mand for the payment of illegal interest.7 The court further held, how-
ever, that partial summary judgment should be rendered in favor of the
plaintiff (who had sought application of Texas law) on the issue of
whether certain letters sent by the defendants met the requirements for
correcting usury violations under the Texas Finance Code. 8
II. SALE OF GOODS
A. STATUTE OF FRAUDS
The basic premise of the Code statute of frauds contained in section
2.201 is that a contract for the sale of goods at a price of more than five
hundred dollars must be in writing and signed by the party against whom
enforcement is sought.9 Even without a writing, however, a contract can
satisfy the statute of frauds requirement if it meets one of three stated
statutory exceptions: (1) if the goods are specially manufactured for the
buyer and are not suitable for resale to others, (2) if the party against
whom enforcement is sought admits in pleadings, testimony, or otherwise
in court that a contract was made, or (3) if payment for the goods has
been made and accepted or if the goods have been received and
accepted.' 0
In Iron Mountain Bison Ranch, Inc. v. Easley Trailer Manufacturing,
Inc.,I' the seller took orders for livestock trailers by using quote sheets
containing specifications and the price along with the name and address
of the buyer and a space for the signature of the person who placed the
order. The court held quote sheets signed by an agent of the buyer were
vidson Oil Country Supply Co. v. Klockner, Inc., 908 F.2d 1238, 1248 (5th Cir. 1990) (ap-
plying Code rules because case arose under the Code).
4. 263 B.R. 773 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2001).
5. Id. at 778-79.
6. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.105(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002) provides, inter alia,
that "when a transaction bears a reasonable relationship to this state and also to another
state or nation the parties may agree that the law either of this state or of such other state
or nation shall govern their rights and duties."
7. See Kemper, 263 B.R. at 782.
8. See id. at 785. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 305.103(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002) permits a
creditor to avoid a usury violation if the creditor corrects the violation within sixty days
after the violation is discovered and before the obligor gives written notice of the violation
or files an action alleging the violation.
9. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201(a) (Vernon 1994).
10. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201(c)(1)-(3) (Vernon 1994).
11. 42 S.W.3d 149 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000, no pet.).
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sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds.12 Despite having won the statute
of frauds battle, judgment in favor of the seller was reversed because the
jury returned a damage verdict in an amount that was not supported by
the evidence. 13
In Continental Casing Corp. v. Siderca Corp.,14 the court held a distrib-
utorship agreement containing a mix of sales and services was within the
Code statute of frauds if the dominant factor of the agreement was the
sale of goods. Noting that no Texas case had addressed the point, the
court chose to follow the majority view in favor of holding that distribu-
torship agreements are subject to the Code.1 5 Since there was no signed
writing evidencing the distributorship agreement, and since none of the
exceptions to the writing requirement were met, the court held the al-
leged agreement was unenforceable as a matter of law. 16
Exceptions to the statute of frauds were addressed in Morena v. In-
genieria E. Maquinaria de Guadalupe, S.A., 17 and Adams v. H & H Meat
Products, Inc.."' In Morena, the court found the "payment exception" of
the statute of frauds was satisfied where the buyer had paid the purchase
price for a hydraulic press despite the lack of a signed writing that could
be characterized as a contract.1 9 The court also held, given the lack of a
signed writing, parol evidence could be introduced on the issue of
whether the plaintiff buyer or the defendant broker (who was acting on
behalf of the seller) was responsible for supplying rail cars to be used to
transport the press to the buyer's factory.20 On this issue the court re-
versed a summary judgment in favor of the buyer and remanded the case
for further consideration in light of the parol evidence proffered by the
defendant broker. 2' In Adams the "accepted goods" exception to the
statute of frauds was satisfied where the buyer accepted delivery of meat
products but subsequently failed to pay for them.22 Judgment in favor of
the plaintiff seller was affirmed.23
12. Id. at 157.
13. Id. at 161. In addition to seeking recovery on an express contract based on the
quote sheets, the seller also sought recovery on theories of promissory estoppel and quan-
tum meruit. The court of appeals ruled the broad-form damage instruction on which the
damage issue was submitted to the jury was erroneous because it included both valid and
invalid theories of liability and it was impossible to determine whether the jury based its
verdict on an improper theory. Id. at 157.
14. 38 S.W.3d 782 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
15. On this point, the court cited cases from eighteen jurisdictions that applied the
Code to distributorship agreements. See Continental, 38 S.W.3d at n.1.
16. Id. at 787-88.
17. 56 S.W.3d 652 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no pet.).
18. 41 S.W.3d 762 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.).
19. See Morena, 56 S.W.3d at 657.
20. Id. at 657-58.
21. Id. at 658-60.
22. See Adams, 41 S.W.3d at 776.
23. Id. at 781.
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B. OUTPUT AND REQUIREMENT CONTRACTS
Deregulation and price fluctuations in the natural gas market have
raised, issues resulting in some significant decisions by the Texas Supreme
Court in recent years. 24 Other issues, however, still remain as illustrated
by the decision in Aquila Southwest Pipeline, Inc. v. Harmony Explora-
tion, Inc..25 In Aquila, a contract required the buyer to purchase and pro-
cess all of the natural gas produced by the seller.26 The principal issue
was whether the contract required the buyer to use its "best efforts" to
promote the sale of gas. 27
In addressing this question, the court discussed some of the prior deci-
sions and noted those decisions did not apply to the best efforts require-
ment in subsection (b) of section 2.306 of the Code. 28 In the case at bar,
the contract covered the purchase and processing of the seller's entire
output and the court concluded the buyer was required to use its best
efforts to promote the sale of gas, because the price to be paid for the gas
depended upon the price the buyer received from subsequent purchas-
ers.29 A jury verdict in favor of the seller was upheld.30
C. WARRANTIES
In PPG Industries, Inc. v. JMB/Houston Centers Partners Limited Part-
nership,3' the court faced a series of intriguing questions about the rela-
tionship between the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) and
express warranties arising under section 2.313 of the Code. 32 First, be-
cause breach of warranty actions can be maintained as suits under the
DTPA, if an express warranty explicitly provides that it covers goods for
24. See, e.g., El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Minco Oil & Gas, Inc., 8 S.W.3d 309 (Tex.
1999) (holding that the Code requirement of good faith is not applicable to the termination
of a contract to purchase natural gas) (discussed in John Krahmer, Commercial Transac-
tions, 53 SMU L. REV. 729, 731 (2000)); N. Natural Gas Co. v. Conoco, Inc., 986 S.W.2d
603 (Tex. 1.999) (holding that contract for processing of natural gas is not an output or
requirements contract where the buyer is not required to purchase any gas) (discussed in
John Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, 52 SMU L. REV. 813, 814-16 (1999)); Lenape
Resources Corp. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 925 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. 1996) (holding that,
if a contract specifies the quantity of gas to be purchased, it is not an output or require-
ments contract under the Code) (discussed in John Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, 50
SMU L. REV. 1025, 1030-31 (1997)).
25. 48 S.W.3d 225 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied).
26. Id. at 231.
27. Id. at 233-34.
28. Id. at 234-35. The court distinguished Northern, 986 S.W.2d 603, because that con-
tract involved only the processing and not the purchase of gas and, therefore, it was not an
output or requirements contract under either TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.306(a) or
(b) (Vernon 1994). Lenape, 925 S.W.2d 565, was distinguished because that contract speci-
fied a quantity of gas to be purchased which meant that it was not an output or require-
ments contract under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.306(a) (Vernon 1994).
29. Aquila, 48 S.W.3d at 234-35.
30. Id. at 247.
31. 41 S.W.3d 270 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, Rule 53.7(f) motion filed).
32. The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act appears as TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 17.43 -.63 (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 2002). The requirements for the creation of ex-
press warranties appear in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.313(a) & (b) (Vernon 1994).
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twenty years, is the action governed by the DTPA as it existed when the
warranty was made or is the action governed by the DTPA as it existed
when suit was filed?33 The resolution of this question was particularly
important because the warranty was made while the 1973 version of
DTPA was in effect and that version provided for mandatory trebling of
damages.34 By the time the breach of warranty was discovered and suit
was filed, the DTPA had been amended to eliminate mandatory treb-
ling.35 In a careful review of the 1973 version and the subsequent amend-
ments, the court held the DTPA should be applied as it existed when the
warranty was made. 36
Second, can a breach of warranty claim brought as a DTPA action be
assigned? Noting a split of authority on the assignability of DTPA claims,
and after a careful review of both prior caselaw and scholarly writings,
the court was persuaded the better view is that such claims can be as-
signed, in part because the claim arose from a breach of warranty which,
as a contract claim, was clearly assignable.37
Third, if an assignee cannot qualify as a consumer under the DTPA
because the assignee is a business consumer with assets of 25 million dol-
lars or more, can the assignee maintain the action based on the assignor's
status as a consumer? 38 The court answered this question in the affirma-
tive in two ways. First, under the ordinary rules of statutory construction,
the amendment was prospective only. Since the exclusion for certain bus-
iness consumers was added to the DTPA by amendment after the war-
ranty had already come into existence, the exclusionary amendment did
not apply. 39 Second, even if the exclusionary amendment did apply, the
assignee was not asserting its own claim, but the claim of the assignor,
and it was the status of the assignor that was controlling.40
Fourth, was the breach of warranty claim barred by limitations? On this
issue, the court held that the discovery rule applied and that factual find-
ings by the court below in the bench trial established the suit had been
brought within the time permitted by the discovery rule under both the
33. Although most warranties have only a four-year lifespan under TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 2.725(a) (Vernon 1994) and the question of which version of the DTPA ap-
plies is usually not in issue, warranties can explicitly extend to the future performance of
the goods and breach can occur at any time during the life of the warranty. See TEX. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725(b) (Vernon 1994).
34. See Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, 1973, 63rd Leg., R.S.,
ch. 143, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws. 322, 327.
35. See Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S.,
ch. 380, § 2, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 1490, 1491.
36. This ruling meant that the difference in the damage recovery was $14,235,111 with
mandatory trebling as compared to $4,745,037 without trebling.
37. PPG, 41 S.W.3d at 276-77.
38. The exclusion of business consumers with assets of 25 million dollars or more was
added to TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon 1987) in 1983. See Deceptive
Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 883, § 2, 1983 Tex.
Gen. Laws 4943, 4944.
39. PPG, 41 S.W.3d at 278-79.
40. Id. at 279.
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DTPA and the Code. 41 Judgment in favor of the buyer was affirmed.42
In Materials Marketing Corp. v. Spencer,43 the plaintiffs sued for breach
of warranty and DTPA violations arising from the purchase and installa-
tion of stone tile that varied in color from the samples they had been
shown when the purchase was made. The seller contended all warranties
had been effectively disclaimed and, furthermore, the contract limited the
seller's liability to an amount equal to the purchase price of the tile
(which would avoid any liability for removal and replacement of the
tile).44 In upholding an award in favor of the homeowners that included
both the purchase price of the tiles and the replacement costs, the court
ruled the attempted disclaimer was ineffective in regard to implied war-
ranties because it was contained on the back of an invoice that was sent
to the contractor who had installed the tile and the contractor had pro-
vided only the front of the invoice to the homeowners. 45 As to whether
the warranty was "conspicuous" as required by section 2.316 of the Code,
the court noted, "The disclaimer cannot be conspicuous to the [home-
owners] if they never received it.' '46 As to express warranties, the court
held an express warranty had been created by sample and that section
2.316(a) of the Code allows an express warranty to survive an inconsis-
tent disclaimer. 47 The limitation of liability clause suffered from the same
problem as the disclaimer-it was on the back of the invoice and was
never seen by the homeowners.48 Under these circumstances, the at-
tempted limitation was ineffective. 49
In Smith v. Radam, Inc.,50 the court held, even if a truck dealer's state-
ments that a used truck was in "good condition" and "would not need
repairs" amounted to express warranties, an "as is" disclaimer prevented
the buyer from showing the seller's conduct was a producing cause of the
harm. Quoting from Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Jefferson As-
41. Id. at 279-84.
42. Id. at 285.
43. 40 S.W.3d 172 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 175.
46. Id.; TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.316(b) (Vernon 1994) requires that the
exclusion or modification of implied warranties must be in writing and must be
conspicuous.,
47. Materials Marketing, 40 S.W.3d at 175. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.§ 2.313(a)(3) (Vernon 1994) provides: "Any sample or model which is made part of the
basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform
to the sample or model."
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.316(a) (Vernon 1994) states:
Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words
or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever
reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of this
chapter on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2.202) negation or limitation
is inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable.
48. Materials Marketing, 40 S.W.3d at 176.
49. Id. Limitations of liability are permitted by TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 2.316(d) (Vernon 1994).
50. 51 S.W.3d 413 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
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sociates, Ltd.,51 the court said:
[An as is] clause precludes a buyer from proving that the seller's con-
duct caused him any harm. When a buyer agrees to purchase some-
thing "as is," he agrees to make his own appraisal of the bargain and
to accept the risk that he may be wrong. In making this choice, a
buyer "removes the possibility that the seller's conduct will cause
him damage." (Citations omitted.)52
The court ruled that summary judgment in favor of the dealer was
proper on the buyer's warranty-based DTPA claim.53 The court did not
discuss the "express warranties survive disclaimers" rule of section
2.316(a) that was applied in the Materials Marketing case. 54
An action for breach of warranty can be maintained even if the damage
only involves the goods themselves as illustrated by Rivera v. Wyeth-
Ayerst Laboratories,55 where the plaintiffs were allowed to proceed with a
suit for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability to recover the
purchase price of a medication that was rendered valueless because of an
FTC order withdrawing the drug from the market, even though no injury
was caused by the medication. If a defective product causes injury, recov-
ery can also be had, of course, for the resulting injury.56
In Otis Spunkmeyer, Inc. v. Blakely,57 the plaintiff was injured by a
hard object concealed in a cookie. In an action for breach of implied war-
ranty and strict liability, the jury found the manufacturer's breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability proximately resulted in the plaintiff's
injury. On the strict liability claim, however, the same jury also found the
defect in the cookie was not a producing cause of the injury.58 While the
court agreed that both implied warranty and strict liability claims were
viable theories on the facts of the case, the conflict in the jury findings
required a remand for a new trial.59
D. TENDER AND ACCEPTANCE
The Code default rule governing contracts for the sale of goods is that
the obligation of the seller is to make tender of delivery and the obliga-
51. 896 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. 1995).
52. Smith, 51 S.W.3d at 416 (citations omitted).
53. Id. at 417. In a DTPA claim based on a breach of warranty, a buyer must prove
that the breach was a "producing cause" of the buyer's damages. See TEX. Bus. & CoM.
CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (Vernon 1987). This is an easier standard to meet than the "proxi-
mate cause" standard required by TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.714, 2.715(b)
(Vernon 1994).
54. Materials Marketing, 40 S.W.3d at 175.
55. 121 F. Supp. 2d 614 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
56. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.715(b) (Vernon 1994) expressly allows recovery
for "injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty."
57. 30 S.W.3d 678 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, Rule 53.7(f) motion filed).
58. Id. at 682.
59. Id. at 691-92.
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tion of the buyer is to accept and pay.60 Tender of delivery requires the
seller to make the goods available to the buyer and to give the buyer any
notification needed for the buyer to take delivery. 61 Unless the parties
have otherwise agreed, the buyer is responsible for providing facilities
that are suitable for receipt of the goods.6 2 Application of these rules
resulted in a summary judgment in favor of the seller in Valero Marketing
& Supply Co. v. Kalama International,63 where the parties had contracted
for the sale and purchase of 20,000 barrels of methanol. The contract
specified that the methanol was to be 99.85 percent pure and delivery was
to take place no later than June 30, 1997.64 On that date, the methanol
was ready for delivery but the barge provided by the buyer was contami-
nated by gasoline residue left by a prior cargo of unleaded gasoline.65 A
third-party company, hired by the seller to do the actual loading, refused
to load the barge because the presence of the gasoline residue would con-
taminate the methanol and lower the purity level.66 Two days later, fol-
lowing an unsuccessful attempt to clean the barge, the seller terminated
the contract. 67 The buyer "covered" by purchasing a similar quantity of
methanol from another source at a higher price.68 The buyer eventually
sued for the increased cost of the cover purchase. After reviewing the
relevant provisions of the Code, the court affirmed summary judgment in
favor of the seller on the ground the buyer failed to fulfill its responsibil-
ity of providing facilities that were reasonably suited to receive the
goods.6
9
In Bacchus Industries, Inc. v. Frontier Mechanical Contractors,70 a sub-
contractor ordered 181 air conditioning units from a manufacturer. The
subcontractor refused to accept the air conditioners because of defects. 71
After some discussion, the manufacturer agreed to repair the units and
the general contractor permitted them to be left at the job sites while the
manufacturer made the repairs. The manufacturer, however, never made
the repairs. Faced with a project deadline, the subcontractor made the
repairs itself, withholding some $35,000 from the amount due as damages
60. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.301 (Vernon 1994) provides, "The obligation of
the seller is to transfer and deliver and that of the buyer is to accept and pay in accordance
with the contract."
61. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.503(a) (Vernon 1994) provides, in part, "Tender
of delivery requires that the seller put and hold conforming goods at the buyer's disposi-
tion and give the buyer any notification reasonably necessary to enable him to take
delivery."
62. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.503(a)(2) (Vernon 1994) provides, "[U]nless
otherwise agreed the buyer must furnish facilities reasonably suited to the receipt of the
goods."
63. 51 S.W.3d 345 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
64. Id. at 347.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 347-48.
67. Id. at 348.
68. Valero Marketing, 51 S.W.3d at 348.
69. Id. at 354.
70. 36 S.W.3d 579 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2001, pet. denied).
71. See id. at 581.
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resulting from the manufacturer's breach. In an action by the manufac-
turer to recover the withheld funds, the trial court, applying common law
contract principles, ruled the manufacturer was not entitled to recover
because it had breached the contract by delivering defective goods. On
appeal, the court held application of this common law rule was error be-
cause the Code clearly provides that post-rejection conduct by a buyer,
such as making repairs and using the goods, constitutes an acceptance
making the buyer liable for the price of the goods. 72 The court further
held, however, it was equally clear that the aggrieved buyer was entitled
to deduct its damages from the price. 73 In this case, the actual damages
suffered by the buyer, as the cost of making the necessary repairs, were
approximately $21,000.7 4 The manufacturer was entitled to recover the
excess amount that had been withheld because the buyer had withheld
$35,000, an amount that exceeded its actual damages by $14,000. 75 Under
these circumstances, both parties were "prevailing parties" on their re-
spective claims for the recovery of attorney's fees. 76
E. DAMAGES
In addition to the overlap between the Code, the DTPA, and the com-
mon law of fraud in regard to theories of action founded on warranty,
misrepresentation, and breach of contract, there is an overlap among
these theories in regard to issues of damages. In the very interesting case
of United States v. Harrop Construction Co., Inc.,77 based on assurances
of timely delivery and performance, a contractor ordered structural steel
from a supplier for three construction projects and also engaged the ser-
vices of the supplier to erect the steel framework for one of the projects.
The supplier failed to make deliveries on time because of a lack of ade-
quate facilities and labor, and completion of the projects was delayed well
beyond their scheduled completion dates.78 In fact, the delays were so
significant that the contractor was forced out of the construction business.
Driven, perhaps, by an understandable disgust with the supplier, the con-
tractor refused to pay for the late deliveries of the structural steel and the
supplier sued for the contract price.79 The contractor counterclaimed, as-
serting claims for breach of contract, fraudulent inducement, negligent
misrepresentation, breach of warranty, and violation of the DTPA.80 The
72. Id. at 585. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.606 (Vernon 1994) provides, in per-
tinent part, "Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer ... (3) does any act inconsistent
with the seller's ownership..."
73. Baccus Industries, 36 S.W.3d at 586. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.717(Vernon 1994) authorizes this remedy for an aggrieved buyer.
74. Baccus Industries, 36 S.W.3d at 581.
75. Id. at 586.
76. Id. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (Vernon 1997) permits a pre-
vailing party to recover attorney's fees in an action founded on contract.






supplier won the battle on its claim for the price of the (albeit late) deliv-
ered steel but, as will be seen, it lost the war on the contractor's
counterclaims.8'
On the counterclaim for breach of contract, the court found there were
untimely deliveries on every purchase order, so it was clear the supplier
had breached its contractual obligations. On the fraudulent inducement
claim, the court was persuaded that the evidence demonstrated that all
elements of this claim had been met.82 On the DTPA claim, the court
found the contractor had proven a violation of section 17.46(b)(23) by
virtue of the supplier's intentional concealment of material information. 83
No evidence of an injury separate and distinct from the injury resulting
from the breach of contract, the negligent misrepresentation claim was
denied and the breach of warranty claim was not pursued during trial so it
also dropped out of the case.84
The court then turned to the question of damages. Recognizing the in-
tertwined nature of the contractor's claims, the court made two funda-
mental points. First, the direct damages available to the contractor were
"virtually the same under any theory of liability and causation. ' 85 Second,
foreseeability was required for the breach of contract and fraudulent in-
ducement claims, but not for the DTPA claim.86 Applying these princi-
ples to the case at bar, the court found the direct damages suffered by the
contractor included the additional costs and expenses resulting from the
delay in completing the construction projects, a total of approximately
one million dollars.87 The court found that it was not foreseeable that the
contractor would be forced out of the construction business because of
the supplier's actions, consequential damages for this loss were not recov-
erable on the breach of contract and fraudulent inducement claims.
Turning to the DTPA violation, the court found the closure of the busi-
ness was a recoverable item of damage because the DTPA does not re-
quire foreseeability and, based on the evidence before it, the court valued
the business at one-point-one million dollars.88
81. Id. at 887.
82. Harrop, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 887. Drawing upon the decision in Formosa Plastics
Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng'rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex. 1998), the court
listed these elements as, "(1) a material misrepresentation (2) which was false (3) which
was either known to be false when made or was asserted without knowledge of its truth (4)
which was intended to be acted upon (5) which was relied upon, and (6) which caused
injury." See Harrop, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 888.
83. Harrop, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 890. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(23)
(Vernon 1987) makes "the failure to disclose information concerning goods or services
which was known at the time of the transaction if such failure to disclose such information
was intended to induce the consumer into a transaction into which the consumer would not
have entered had the information been disclosed" a violation of the DTPA.
84. Harrop, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 890.
85. Id. at 891.





This did not, however, conclude the damage analysis. In addition to the
direct and consequential damages, the court found the conduct of the
supplier to be so egregious that punitive damages should be awarded on
the fraudulent inducement and DTPA claims.89 Based largely on the leg-
islative choice contained in the DTPA, the court awarded an amount
equal to three times the amount of the contractor's direct and conse-
quential damages, resulting in a figure of six-point-six million dollars. 90
This amount, coupled with the actual damage award, resulted in a judg-
ment for the contractor of almost nine million dollars with a setoff al-
lowed to the supplier on its claim to recover the three-hundred-thousand
dollar price of the steel it had delivered. 91
F. ARBITRATION
Several cases decided during the Survey period addressed issues sur-
rounding the use of arbitration as a means of settling disputes arising
under Chapter 2. In Helena Chemical Co. v. Wilkins,92 a group of farmers
sued a seed company for breach of warranties and DTPA violations aris-
ing from alleged defects in seed purchased from the seller. Seventeen
months after suit was filed, the farmers submitted their claims to the
Texas Plant and Seed Board for arbitration.93 The Board declined to ar-
bitrate because it was unable to inspect the crops in "field condition" due
to the delay.94 The case proceeded to trial.95 The trial court found that
the seller had effectively disclaimed all warranties, but the farmers pre-
vailed on their DTPA claims. The seller appealed, arguing that there was
insufficient evidence to support the DTPA violations and, more impor-
tantly, that the failure to timely submit the claim to arbitration barred the
farmers' claims.96 On this issue of first impression, the Texas Supreme
Court held, while the arbitration requirements of the Texas Seed Arbitra-
tion Act 97 were mandatory, they were not jurisdictional in nature and did
not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to try the case even if there was
a delay in submitting the claim for arbitration.98 The court noted, how-
ever, if a seed purchaser does not submit a claim in time for the Board or
the seller to conduct a field inspection, the purchaser does so at his or her
peril since the Board could make findings adverse to the purchaser on
this basis. 99 The court upheld the rulings of the lower courts on the war-
ranty and DTPA issues. 100
89. Harrop, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 892-93.
90. Id. at 893.
91. Id. at 895.
92. 47 S.W.3d 486 (Tex. 2001).
93. Id. at 491.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 491-92.
97. TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. §§ 64.001-.007 (Vernon 1995).
98. Helena, 47 S.W.3d at 494.
99. Id. at 496.
100. Id. at 506.
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One of the few reasons an arbitration clause may not be enforced is a
successful showing that agreement to the clause was induced in a proce-
durally unconscionable manner. In re Rangel'01 was a mandamus pro-
ceeding contesting the enforcement of an arbitration clause in a contract
for extermination services. The court applied the standard rule that the
party contesting arbitration has the burden of proving procedural uncon-
scionability and held that the record did not show the trial judge had
abused his discretion in ruling that the defense had not been adequately
proven. 10 2 On another issue in the same case, the court further held both
husband and wife were bound by the arbitration clause even though the
wife had not signed the contract, because she was a third-party benefici-
ary who would be benefited by the extermination services.
10 3
In In re FirstMerit Bank,104 the buyers purchased a mobile home under
an installment sales contract that was assigned to a bank as part of the
financing arrangement. The contract contained an "Arbitration Adden-
dum" requiring binding arbitration for "all disputes, claims, or other mat-
ters in question arising out of or relating to this Loan. '1 0 5 The word
"Loan" was defined to include all provisions of the sales and loan docu-
ments and the addendum also warned that "the scope of arbitrability is
broad and includes, without limitation, contractual, tort, statutory, and
caselaw claims."'106
Following delivery of the home, several defects surfaced and the seller
failed to make repairs. The buyers stopped making payments and the
home was repossessed by the bank.10 7 The buyers sued on several theo-
ries, including revocation of acceptance, breach of warranty, fraud, and
DTPA violations. The bank and the seller both moved to compel arbitra-
tion. 10 8 The motion was denied by the trial court and this ruling was up-
held by the court of appeals. On further appeal, the Texas Supreme
Court held the installment contract and the arbitration addendum were
governed by the Federal Arbitration Act because the transaction in-
volved interstate commerce. 10 9 Furthermore, according to the Court, the
broad language of the addendum was sufficient to cover all complaints
regarding the mobile home whether arising out of the loan and reposses-
sion or out of alleged defects in the home itself.110 The court rejected
defenses that the arbitration addendum should not be enforced because
of a lack of evidence that the costs of arbitration would be excessive, that
the addendum had been signed under duress, or that there had been any
misrepresentation about the existence and scope of the arbitration provi-
101. 45 S.W.3d 783 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no pet.).
102. Id. at 786-87.
103. Id. at 787.
104. 52 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. 2001).
105. Id. at 752.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 753.
108. Id.
109. Firstmerit, 52 S.W.3d at 754.
110. Id. at 755.
[Vol. 55
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
sions. 111 The court also rejected defenses based on unconscionability and
revocation of acceptance because those defenses went to the contract as a
whole and not specifically to the arbitration addendum. 12
In re American Homestar of Lancaster, Inc.113 was another mandamus
proceeding concerning an arbitration clause in a contract for the purchase
of a manufactured home. As in FirstMerit, the contract contained provi-
sions requiring all claims, disputes, and controversies arising out of the
purchase to be settled by binding arbitration.114 The trial court had or-
dered that the case go to arbitration, but the buyers had successfully ar-
gued in the court of appeals that the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act 15 prohibited enforcement of binding arbitration clauses. 116 In con-
cluding the arbitration clause was unenforceable, the court of appeals had
relied in part on the interpretation of the Magnuson-Moss Act by the
Federal Trade Commission.' 17
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held the
arbitration clause was enforceable against the buyers and that nothing in
the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act precluded the parties from
agreeing to binding arbitration.118 The court further held no Federal
Trade Commission regulation specifically prohibited binding arbitration
and that, while the Court was required to give deference to agency inter-
pretations, it was not bound by an unreasonable agency interpretation." 9
Noting that "the FTC's position about binding arbitration has been less
than consistent," the court ruled the trial court had been correct in com-
pelling arbitration and conditionally granted a writ of mandamus di-
recting the court of appeals to vacate its judgment.' 20
III. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS AND
BANK TRANSACTIONS
A. LIABILITY OF PARTIES
One of the most common problems agents seem to encounter in sign-
ing negotiable instruments is the failure to adequately indicate their
agency status.' 21 A recent example of this problem appears in Caraway v.
111. Id. at 757-58.
112. Id. at 757-58. The requirement that defenses must be directed specifically toward
an arbitration clause and not toward the contract as a whole is derived from the interpreta-
tion of the Federal Arbitration Act announced in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967).
113. 50 S.W.3d 480 (Tex. 2001).
114. Id. at 482.
115. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2301-12 (West 2000).
116. See In re Van Blarcum, 19 S.W.3d 484 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, reversed,
sub nom, In re American Homestar of Lancaster, Inc., 50 S.W.3d 480 (Tex. 2001).
117. See Van Blarcum, 19 S.W.3d at 496.
118. American Homestar, 50 S.W.3d at 487.
119. Id. at 490-91.
120. Id.
121. The rules governing signatures by representatives appear in TEx. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 3.402 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
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Land Design Studio, 22 where a realty company hired a landscaping ser-
vice to work on an apartment complex project. 12 3 The realty company
agreed to sign a promissory note for the work.' 2 4 The parties executed a
note naming the company president as debtor but the note did not indi-
cate his capacity as president of the company. The note was to be paid in
full on March 31, 1999.125 No payment was received and the creditor
filed suit against the company and against the president individually. The
president asserted that he had been fraudulently induced by the creditor
to sign the note and that he had signed the note only as an agent of the
company. 126
The court found there was no evidence suggesting any trickery had
been employed by the creditor to entice the president to sign the note. 127
Although the president asserted that the creditor represented the note
would not be due until the construction loan closed, the court held such a
representation did not constitute trickery so as to allow parol evidence to
be offered beyond the terms stated in the note. In addition, the president
argued that his intent was known to the creditor that he was to sign the
note only as an agent of the realty company. 128 The court held that, to
gauge intent, the note itself was the best indicator, and the note did not
indicate the president's representative capacity. 2 9 Since the president
failed to show facts supporting fraudulent inducement or that he signed
only as an agent, the court affirmed the trial court ruling holding the pres-
ident personally liable for the amount of the note. 30
Another issue affecting liability that occurs with some frequency, is
whether an applicable limitations period has passed that bars collection
of an instrument. The determination of the applicable statute of limita-
tions, however, is not always an easy task. For example, in Hodge v.
Northern Trust Bank of Texas, N.A., 131 a minor received a settlement aris-
ing out of injuries suffered in an accident. The court order approving the
settlement directed that the settlement funds be deposited in an interest
bearing book-entry certificate of deposit account held under the direction
of the minor's mother for the minor's benefit. 32 The order also required
the account be considered a special deposit. When the certificate of de-
posit matured, the mother withdrew the funds to pay some of her own
outstanding debts. 133 The minor did not inquire about the account until
twelve years after he had attained the age of majority. When he discov-
122. 47 S.W.3d 696 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, no pet.).
123. Id. at 697.
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. Id. at 697.
127. Caraway, 47 S.W.3d at 699.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 700.
130. Id. at 701.
131. 54 S.W.3d 518 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2001, pet. denied).




ered that the funds had been withdrawn, he sued the bank to recover an
amount equal to the value of the deposit account. 134 Affirming the trial
court, the court of appeals held that the special deposit created a bailor-
bailee relationship between the bank as bailee and the mother as
bailor.135 Since this was a special deposit, the court held that the only
claim available to the plaintiff was a claim for conversion, and the two
year statute of limitations began to run in 1987 when the plaintiff reached
the age of majority.1 36 Thus, when suit was brought twelve years later, the
limitations period had already expired. The court rejected application of
the "discovery rule" because that rule tolls the running of the limitations
period only when the conversion is "inherently undiscoverable.' 37 The
court also rejected an argument that the limitations period contained in
section 3.118(e) 138 should apply because the certificate of deposit in this
case was in the form of a book-entry special deposit and, therefore, it was
not a negotiable instrument governed by Chapter 3 of the Code.139
Although the Texas version of section 3.118 generally follows the uni-
form text, the Texas enactment includes a non-uniform addition desig-
nated as subsection (h). 140 Under this subsection, the usual six-year
limitation period does not apply to actions involving real property liens,
134. Id.
135. Id. at 522.
136. Hodge, 54 S.W.3d at 523.
137. Id. at 523.
138. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.118(e) (Vernon Supp. 2002) provides that the
limitations period to enforce the obligation of a party to a certificate of deposit is six years
after demand for payment is made to the maker.
139. Hodge, 54 S.W.3d at 525. Although it was not effective at the time this action
arose, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.102(a)(59) (Vernon Supp. 2002) adds additional
support for the conclusion that a book-entry certificate of deposit is not a negotiable in-
strument. That section, which became effective on July 1, 2001, provides, in part:
"Nonnegotiable certificate of deposit" means a writing signed by a bank that:
(A) states on its face that it is a certificate of deposit, as defined in Section
3.104, or receipt for book entry;
(B) contains an acknowledgement that a sum of money has been received by
the bank, with an express or implied agreement that the bank will repay the
sum of money; and
(C) is not a negotiable instrument.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.102(a)(59) (Vernon 2002) is a non-uniform amendment
to revised Chapter 9 of the Code. State Bar Uniform Commercial Code Committee Com-
ment 2 to this section states the following about "book-entry" certificates of deposit:
"Book entry 'certificates of deposit' are described in account agreements and appropriate
disclosures but modern banking practice has moved away from the use of formal certifi-
cates for what [are] otherwise known as 'time deposits' or 'time accounts ....
140. The last subsection in the uniform text of the Commercial Code is subsection (g).
During the 2001 legislative session, Texas also added a non-uniform subsection (i) that
provides, "A right of action of a public institution of higher education or the Texas Higher
Education Coordinating Board is not barred by this section." See Act of May 22, 2001, 77th
Leg., R.S., ch. 279, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 530-31.
Under this non-uniform amendment, it appears that Texas colleges and universities, as
well as the Coordinating Board are not subject to any limitations period in seeking to
collect amounts due on negotiable instruments. Thus, a long delay in seeking to collect a
student loan will not bar recovery on limitations grounds.
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but instead, the limitations period is only four years. 141 In Holy Cross
Church of God in Christ v. Wolf,142 the court applied section 3.118(h) to
bar an action that was commenced more than four years after the acceler-
ation of a note. The court rejected an argument that the holder was enti-
tled to the benefit of the six-year period available to the FDIC because
the holder had purchased the note from the FDIC.143 On this point, the
court reasoned that because the acceleration did not take place until after
the sale of the note by the FDIC the four-year limitations period was
applicable. 144 The court stated, "When a cause of action has not accrued
before the FDIC transfers a note, a transferee has the same four years
under section 16.035(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code to
sue as any other person. Accordingly, refusal to extend limitations in this
situation does not significantly impact the FDIC's notes'
marketability."145
In reaching its decision, the court also disapproved of Swoboda v. Wil-
shire Credit Corp146 and its progeny to the extent that case could be read
to require affirmative action toward foreclosure to trigger acceleration of
a note secured by real property when the agreement of the parties does
not require such action. Instead, the court held that a clear, positive, and
unequivocal declaration of acceleration and intent to foreclose triggers
the beginning of the limitations period whether or not it is followed by
affirmative action to foreclose. 147
B. LoST INSTRUMENTS
Section 3.309 of the Code allows enforcement of lost, destroyed, or sto-
len instruments if the claimant is able to prove the terms of the instru-
ment and the reason it cannot be produced. 148 The claimant may be
required to provide a bond or other adequate protection to protect the
obligor against the possibility that another person may later seek to en-
force the instrument. 149 In Caddo Parish-Villas South, Ltd. v. Beal Bank,
S.S.B.,150 a bankruptcy case litigated in the Northern District of Texas but
applying Louisiana law (which is the same as the Texas law on the matter
in issue), the court held that the assignee of a note had satisfied all of the
elements required to prove enforceability of the note. The assignee was
able to prove that the assignor was in possession of the note when it was
141. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.118(h) (Vernon Supp. 2002) provides: "This
section does not apply to an action involving a real property lien covered by Section 16.035
or 16.036, Civil Practice and Remedies Code."
142. 44 S.W.3d 562 (Tex. 2001).
143. Id. at 574. Under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)(A)(i) (2000) the FDIC is entitled to a
six-year limitation period for the enforcement of notes when it becomes the receiver of a
failed bank.
144. Holy Cross, 44 S.W.3d at 574.
145. Id.
146. 975 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, pet. denied).
147. Id.
148. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.309 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
149. Id.
150. 250 F.3d 300 (5th Cir. 2001).
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lost; thus, the court was not required to resolve a disagreement that had
surfaced about whether section 3.309 permits recovery when a party is
not in possession of an instrument at the time it is lost.15'
C. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
Until adoption of section 3.311 of the Code, there was uncertainty
about the effect of cashing a check containing language such as, "Pay-
ment in Full."'1 52 Section 3.311 now provides that cashing a check contain-
ing a conspicuous statement to the effect that it is tendered in full
payment of a claim will work an accord and satisfaction of an unliqui-
dated or disputed debt, unless the person cashing the check tenders re-
payment of the amount of the check within ninety days after the check
has been paid. 153 After ninety days, the debt is discharged. 154
Calabrian Chemicals Corp. v. Bailey-Buchanan Masonry, Inc.,155 is the
first Texas case to consider the effect of section 3.311. The dispute arose
out of a contract to construct a building.156 After the work was com-
pleted, the building owner sent a check to the contractor in the amount of
$68,000.157 The check also bore the notation, "FINAL PAYMENT ON
OUR PURCHASE ORDER 10356 which was not to exceed 68,000."158
Despite having knowledge of this notation, the contractor deposited the
check and it was paid by the owner's bank. The contractor subsequently
sued the owner for payment of an additional amount that the contractor
claimed was still due.1 59 The trial court refused the owner's request for a
jury issue on accord and satisfaction but instead submitted an issue on
whether the invoice represented the complete agreement of the par-
ties.160 On appeal, the court held this was error on the part of the trial
judge and ruled that an unconditional issue on accord and satisfaction
should have been submitted to the jury.161 The court was unable to find
an accord and satisfaction as a matter of law, however, because the evi-
dence conflicted on whether the only dispute between the parties con-
151. The disagreement centers on the requirement in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 3.309(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2002) that a person who is seeking to enforce a lost, de-
stroyed, or stolen instrument show that "the person was in possession of the instrument
and entitled to enforce it when loss of possession occurred." The various cases and the
arguments surrounding this matter are ably discussed in Timothy R. Zinnecker, Extending
Enforcement Rights to Assignees of Lost, Destroyed, or Stolen Negotiable Instruments under
U.C.C. Article 3: A Proposal for Reform, 50 KAN. L. REV. 111 (2001).
152. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.311 (Vernon Supp. 2002) was adopted during
the 1995 legislative session. See Act of May 28, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 921, §§ 1-2, 1995
Tex. Gen. Laws 4582.
153. § 3.311(b).
154. § 3.311(c)(2).
155. 44 S.W.3d 276 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2001, pet. denied).
156. Id. at 277.
157. Id. at 279-80.
158. Id. at 280.
159. Id.
160. Calabrian Chemicals, 44 S.W.3d at 280-81.
161. Id. at 281.
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cerned the invoice referenced on the check. 162 The case was, therefore,
remanded for a new trial.' 63
D. INDORSEMENT OF INSTRUMENTS
Proper indorsement of an instrument is critical. Without proper in-
dorsement, transfer of an instrument may be defective or payment may
be made to the wrong person.164 It is not always easy, however, to deter-
mine whether an indorsement is proper. A trap for the unwary contained
in section 3.110(d) is a change in the rule as it existed under the former
section 3.116 that was in effect in Texas until January 1, 1996. This rule
provided that an instrument had to be indorsed by all parties unless the
instrument listed the payees in the alternative. 165 As revised, section
3.110(d) changes the rule to provide that, if an instrument is ambiguous
as to whether it is payable jointly or in the alternative, it is deemed to be
payable in the alternative and can be indorsed and negotiated by any one
of the payees. 166 Thus, because of this change in the rule, in Allied Capi-
tal Partners, L.P. v. Bank One, Texas, N.A.,' 67 a check made payable to:
Complete Design
Allied Capital Partners, L.P.
was ambiguous as to whether the indorsement of one or both payees was
required. Applying the "new" rule of section 3.110(d), the court held that
the check was properly indorsed when only one of the payees deposited
the check and received the proceeds.1 68 Judgment was affirmed in favor
of the bank that paid the check.1 6
9
Under the version of Chapter 3 that was in effect in Texas prior to
January 1, 1996, it was well-established that a bank could not refuse pay-
ment of a cashier's check.1 70 The author has noted elsewhere that revised
Chapter 3 "reverses this result and provides a bank with the right to re-
fuse payment on cashier's checks . ..under narrowly defined circum-
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Several provisions of the Code defining the rights and liabilities of parties hinge on
proper indorsement. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.203, .204, .205, .301, .416,
.417 & .420 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
165. Compare the present TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.110(d) (Vernon Supp.
2002) with the former TEX. Bus. & COM. COE ANN. § 3.116 (Vernon 1994). The present
version of Chapter 3 was adopted in the 1995 legislative session with an effective date of
January 1, 1996. See Act of May 28, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 921, §§ 1-2, 1995 TEX. GEN.
LAWS 4582.
166. § 3.110(d).
167. 68 S.W.3d 51 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, no pet. h.).
168. Id. at 54.
169. Id. at 55.
170. See, e.g., Wertz v. Richardson Heights Bank & Trust, 495 S.W.2d 572, 574 (Tex.
1973). Chapter 3 of the Code was revised in the 1995 legislative session with an effective





Associated Carriages, Inc. v. International Bank of Commerce,172 seems
to be the first case to address a bank's refusal to pay a cashier's check
under the revised Code. In an action by the payee against the bank, the
court held the bank acted properly when it refused to pay a cashier's
check on the ground that the bank had a reasonable doubt about whether
the payee was the person entitled to enforce the instrument. 173 The
check in question was made payable to a corporation, but was presented
by an individual.' 74 The bank had a policy of refusing to cash checks pay-
able to a corporation when they were presented by an individual. The
court held the policy was supported by the bank's evidence showing the
policy was designed to ensure money intended for the corporation did not
"end up in the hands of an unauthorized individual.' 1 75 The bank also
introduced testimony that "there was no proof an individual could bring
to the bank to prove that he or she was authorized to transact business on
behalf of the corporation because a reasonable doubt always exist[s]
about whether the person was authorized to act on behalf of the corpora-
tion."'1 76 Judgment in favor of the bank was affirmed, including a sanction
allowing the bank to recover its attorney's fees based on the court's anal-
ysis of the plaintiff's claims as "not credible" and as lacking evidentiary
support.' 77 In the view of the court, the plaintiff was attempting "to use
the lawsuit to recoup financial losses that occurred for reasons unrelated
to the bank."'1 78
E. PAYMENT OF FORGED INSTRUMENTS
Section 4-406 of the Code allocates the burden of discovering and re-
porting forgeries between a bank and its depositor by imposing time lim-
its for action and by stating duties of good faith and ordinary care
applicable to both parties. 179 In Canfield v. Bank One, Texas, N.A., 180 the
court held a depositor was precluded from recovering on some 213 for-
geries by his ex-wife when he failed to notify the bank of the forgeries
within the time period allowed by statute, for forgeries by the same
wrongdoer, or within the 90 day time period provided in the deposit
agreement as an absolute bar date for the reporting of forgeries. 181 The
171. See John Krahmer, 12 TEXAS PRACTICE: METHODS OF PRACTICE, § 26.73 (Supp.
2001). The operative provision is TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.411 (Vernon Supp.
2002). There was no similar provision under the prior version of Chapter 3.
172. 37 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. denied).
173. Id. at 73.
174. Id. at 71.
175. Id. at 73.
176. Id.
177. Associated Carriages, 37 S.W.3d at 76 (quoting from the trial court's sanction
order).
178. Id.
179. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.406 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
180. 51 S.W.3d 828 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. denied).
181. Chapter 4 of the Code was substantially amended in the 1995 legislative session
with an effective date of January 1, 1996. See Act of May 28, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 921,
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forgeries began sometime in 1990, continued until December of 1992, and
involved both checks and certificates of deposit. 182 The last statement on
the account was delivered to the depositor in January of 1993 but no com-
plaint was made until May of that year.183 The court held that the 90 day
time period in the deposit agreement was not unreasonably short and,
absent any evidence of bad faith on the part of the bank, the depositor
was barred from any recovery. 184
The depositor attempted to avoid the effect of the limitation period by
asserting a separate DTPA claim.185 On this issue, the court held that, as
to the checks, the obligation of the bank was a contractual obligation gov-
erned by contract law and not by the DTPA.186 As to the certificates of
deposit, the court held the depositor did not seek to acquire goods or
services, but only an intangible; furthermore, he did not seek the bank's
advice about purchasing the CDs so there were no collateral services on
which a DTPA claim might be based.187
Although not relevant on the facts of this case, it should be noted that
section 4-406 contains a comparative negligence provision that might be
important if a customer delays in reporting forgeries by the same wrong-
doer for more than the thirty day time period allowed by statute, but less
than the time period provided in a deposit agreement.'8 8 Even with a
comparative negligence rule, however, action by the depositor in Canfield
was simply "too little, too late."
F. PAYMENT OF CHECKS "AT PAR"
In Wells Fargo Bank Texas, N.A. v. James,i89 an action brought by sev-
eral large national banks against the Texas Banking Commissioner, the
federal district court for the Western District of Texas enjoined the Bank-
ing Commissioner from enforcing a non-uniform Texas amendment that
added section 4.112 to Chapter 4 of the Code during the 2001 legislative
session. 190 The amendment required payor banks to pay presented checks
"at par" without a deduction or charge for the service of cashing the
§§ 1-2, 1995 TEX. GEN. LAWS 4582. The amendment changed the statutory time period for
reporting forgeries by the same wrongdoer from 14 days to 30 days. Although this case
arose under the former TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.406 (Vernon 1994), the change
from 14 days to 30 days has no effect under the facts of this case.
182. Canfield, 51 S.W.3d at 833.
183. Id. at 833.
184. Id. at 836-37.
185. Id. at 838.
186. Id. at 839.
187. Canfield, 51 S.W.3d at 839-40.
188. Under the comparative negligence provisions in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 4.406(e) (Vernon Supp. 2002), if a customer can show a lack of ordinary care on the part
of the bank, the loss could be allocated between the customer and the bank based on the
extent to which the actions of each party contributed to the loss. Showing a lack of ordi-
nary care by a bank is a lesser burden than showing that a bank acted in bad faith, which
was the burden the plaintiff had to carry in Canfield.
189. 184 F. Supp. 2d 588 (W.D. Tex. 2001).
190. See Act of June 13, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 699, § 20, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1260.
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checks.' 91 The OCC had issued an opinion letter concluding that the Na-
tional Bank Act and the Code of Federal Regulations permit national
banks to charge fees to non-account holders for cashing checks drawn on
the banks.' 92 Giving deference to this opinion letter, the court ruled the
plaintiff banks were likely to prevail on the merits and issued a prelimi-
nary injunction against enforcement of the statute.193 As part of its or-
der, the court required the banks to establish a refund or voucher system
pending final resolution of the case in the event the court ultimately held
the statute enforceable. 19
4
G. FUNDS TRANSFERS
In Moody National Bank v. Texas City Development Ltd., Co.,195 a pur-
chaser attempted to buy a municipal property by depositing the purchase
price with an escrow agent to demonstrate good faith to the city agency.
The purchaser arranged to have the purchase amount wired to a title
company account in a local bank. 196 When the purchaser sought to verify
completion of the wire transfer, he was informed by the bank that it had
never received the transfer. 97 The transfer, however, was later found to
have been successful, but this was not discovered when the purchaser
made inquiry because of the wire transfer clerk's failure to check either
the title account history or the wire transfer log.198 The purchaser subse-
quently lost his bid for the property and sued the bank for common law
negligence. 99 The suit was successful and the jury awarded a substantial
sum to the purchaser. The bank appealed the jury verdict, alleging the
funds transfer was within Chapter 4A of the Code, thereby negating the
common law negligence claim.200
The court of appeals decided that common law claims are precluded
when such claims impose sanctions inconsistent with the provisions of
Chapter 4A. The court held misinforming the purchaser and the city
agency was akin to failing to send proper notice, a matter specifically de-
scribed in section 4A.404(b) of the Code.20 1 The court stated that the
remedies for violation of this section were also set out in Chapter 4A and,
therefore, the common law negligence recovery was invalid because the
purchaser was limited to the remedies provided by the Code.
20 2
191. See Wells Fargo Bank, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 591.
192. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 24 (West 2002); 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002(a) (2002).
193. Wells Fargo Bank, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 592.
194. Id.
195. 46 S.W.3d 373 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
196. Id. at 375-76.
197. Id. at 376.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Moody Nat'l Bank, 46 S.W.3d at 376.
201. Id. at 379. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4A.404(b) (Vernon 1994).
202. Moody Nat'l Bank, 46 S.W.3d at 379. Under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 4A.404(b) (Vernon 1994), damages are limited to the payment of interest on the amount
of the payment order from the day notice should have been given until the day when the
beneficiary learns of the receipt of the payment order.
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IV. LET'ERS OF CREDIT
A. DUTIES OF ISSUER
In Heritage Bank v. Redcom Laboratories, Inc.,203 a bank issued a let-
ter of credit for a corporate applicant to purchase goods from a seller.
After the seller delivered the goods to the corporation, the seller made a
presentment under the credit to the issuing bank to obtain payment. 20 4
Before the bank paid under the letter of credit, the corporation obtained
a temporary injunction enjoining the bank from making payment on the
ground the presentment was improper. The seller made two more pre-
sentments while the injunction was in effect and the bank refused to
honor the draw under both of them on the basis of the injunction. 20 5 A
third presentment was made after the injunction was dissolved and the
bank again refused payment, this time on the ground that the credit had
expired while the injunction was in effect. The bank sought a declaratory
judgment in state court asserting it had acted properly in refusing pay-
ment.20 6 The seller removed the case to federal court where the seller
prevailed on its claim that the bank wrongfully dishonored the seller's
presentments. 207
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the court found, by its terms, the letter
of credit was governed by the Uniform Customs & Practices for Docu-
mentary Credits (UCP).20 8 Under the UCP, an issuer is required to notify
a beneficiary such as the seller of any discrepancies within 21 days after a
presentment is made under a credit. The court held the bank waived its
right to assert discrepancies because the injunction only prohibited the
bank from paying upon an improper presentment; it did not relieve the
bank from its duty to notify the seller of any discrepancies in regard to
the seller's second presentment within the required time period.20 9 Be-
cause the bank waived its right to assert discrepancies, and the second
presentment by the seller was timely, the bank was required to make pay-
ment when the injunction was lifted even if the letter of credit expired
while the injunction was in place. As stated by the court, "[A]n injunction
may provide a defense of impossibility for as long as it stands, but once it
is lifted, the bank must honor or properly dishonor the drafts. '210
203. 250 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 2001).




208. Heritage, 250 F.3d at 325-26. The letter of credit designated Uniform Customs and
Practice for Documentary Credits, 1993 Revision, I.C.C. Publication No. 500 as the gov-
erning law. Under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.103(c) (Vernon Supp. 2002), the
terms of a letter of credit can be varied by agreement.





A. TRUE LEASE OR DISGUISED SECURITY INTEREST
The determination of whether a transaction denominated as a "lease"
of personal property constitutes a "true lease" or merely a "disguised se-
curity interest" can have significant effects in a bankruptcy proceeding. If
the transaction is a true lease, the lessor is entitled to adequate protection
of its ownership interest and, if such adequate protection is not provided,
the lessor is entitled to repossess the goods. 211 If the transaction is a dis-
guised security interest, the security interest can be avoided unless it has
been properly perfected under Chapter 9.212 Classifying a transaction as a
true lease or as a disguised security interest is based on what is generally
termed the "economic realities test" contained in section 1.201 of the
Code. 2 13 That test has two parts. The first is to determine if the lessee can
terminate the lease before the end of the lease term.214 If the lessee does
not have the right to terminate, the second is to establish the residual
value of the goods, if any, that was anticipated by the parties at the end of
the lease term.2 15
In In re Triplex Marine Maintenance, Inc.,2 16 the court carefully re-
viewed the economic realities test and its application to a sale-and-lease-
back transaction covering all of a bankrupt lessee's equipment. By the
terms of the lease, it was clear that the lessee did not have the right to
terminate the lease before the end of the lease term so the first part of the
test was satisfied.2 1 7 As to the second part of the test, the court found the
critical inquiry was whether it made economic sense for the lessee to fail
to exercise an option to purchase the goods at the end of the lease
term.218 Reviewing the economic choices available to the lessee at the
211. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (2000).'
212. 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2000) permits the trustee in bankruptcy to avoid unperfected se-
curity interests. Perfection of a security interest under Chapter 9 is usually accomplished by
filing a financing statement. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.310 (Vernon Supp.
2002). The former Chapter 9 contained a similar provision. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 9.302 (Vernon 1994).
213. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(37)(B) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
214. Id.
215. The economic realities test and the two part analysis are discussed at length in E.
Carolyn Hochstadter Dicker & John P. Campo, FF & E and the True Lease Question:
Article 2A and Accompanying Amendments to UCC Section 1-201(37), 7 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 517 (1999).
216. 258 B.R. 659 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2000).
217. Id. at 669-70.
218. Id. at 671. On this point, the court, quoting from prior decisions on the same issue,
said:
Articulated as a "sensible person" test, [the test] provides that "where the
terms of the lease and option to purchase are such the only sensible course
for the lessee at the end of the lease term is to exercise the option and be-
come the owner of the goods, the lease was intended to create a security
interest." ... Articulated in a less genteel manner, "if only a fool would fail
to exercise the purchase option, the option is generally considered nominal




end of the lease term, the court concluded the only realistic choice would
be for the lessee to exercise the option to purchase. As stated by the
court, "Under these circumstances, this was not a typical finance lease. It
was typical financing, disguised as a lease. '219 This "lease" was actually a
security interest and the lessor had not taken the precaution of timely
filing a financing statement; therefore, the trustee could avoid the secur-
ity interest and the lessor could not repossess the goods.220
B. PERFECTION AND PRIORITY OF SECURITY INTERESTS
Although significant changes have been made by revised Chapter 9 in
the rules governing the proper location for filing a financing statement,
the use of a debtor's trade name instead of the debtor's actual name is
still treated as being insufficient to perfect a security interest regardless of
where the financing statement is filed.221 Thus, the result in In re Stan-
ton,222 where the court held that a financing statement that listed only
the debtor's trade name did not perfect a security interest in inventory
where the loan had actually been made to the debtor as an individual is
still good law.
In W.H.V., Inc. v. Associates Housing Finance, LLC,223 a couple pur-
chased real estate with a promissory note secured by a vendor's lien and
deed of trust. The vendor's lien and deed of trust were properly recorded
in the county real estate records.224 A year later, the couple purchased a
mobile home under a Manufactured Home Retail Installment Contract/
Security Agreement and a certificate of title was issued for the mobile
home which acknowledged the dealer's purchase money security inter-
est.225 After significant improvements were made to the home, the
couple divorced and defaulted on the promissory note.226 A creditor who
had acquired the security interest in the mobile home from the dealer
sued the couple for the unpaid balance on the sales contract. The mort-
219. id. at 673.
220. Id. The lessor did, in fact, file a financing statement but this was not done until
two months after the lessee had filed for bankruptcy. Id. at 663. As a practical matter,
unless it is absolutely clear that a transaction involves a true lease instead of a disguised
security interest, there is no good reason for a lessor not to file a financing statement,
particularly since TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 9.505 (Vernon Supp. 2002) permits
precautionary filings and explicitly states that such a filing "is not of itself a factor in deter-
mining whether the collateral secures an obligation."
221. Perfection by filing must now be in the state where the debtor is located. See TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.301(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002). Under the former Chapter 9,
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.103 generally required filing in the state where the
collateral was located (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 2002). Revised Chapter 9 was adopted in
Texas during the 1999 legislative session to become effective on July 1, 2001. See Act of
June 18, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 414, § 1.01, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 2639. Several technical
amendments were made during the 2001 legislative session, but the effective date remained
the same. See Act of June 13, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 705, §§ 1-24 Tex. Gen. Laws 1403
(codified as TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.101 -.709 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
222. 254 B.R. 357 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2000).
223. 43 S.W.3d 83 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied).
224. Id.




gagee, fearing loss of his interest in the mobile home, sought a declara-
tory judgment that the mobile home was no longer considered a mobile
home but, instead, had become part of the real estate.227 The secured
creditor argued that its security interest was superior to the mortgagee's
lien. 228
On appeal, the court phrased the issue as "whether a prior filed lien in
the county real estate records was a prior perfected lien against a manu-
factured home. '2 29 Finding the issue was essentially the same as that pre-
viously litigated in Gies v. NCNB Texas Forney Banking Center,230 the
court reasoned that the analysis in Gies had not changed and the secured
creditor had properly followed the procedures in the Texas Manufactured
Housing Standards Act (MHSA) to perfect its interest.231 The secured
creditor, therefore, had the superior claim to the mobile home and the
judgment of the trial court was affirmed.
In Texas Workforce Commission v. MidFirst Bank,232 a bank loaned
money to a debtor under a promissory note and security agreement
granting the bank a security interest in all of the debtor's receivables. The
bank perfected the security interest by filing a financing statement with
the Texas Secretary of State and in various Texas counties where the
debtor was conducting business.233 Subsequently, the debtor defaulted
on the note, and the bank obtained a judgment in an Oklahoma federal
court for the balance of the note and foreclosure of the bank's security
interest.234 The debtor also owed the Texas Workforce Commission
(TWC) approximately six months of unpaid unemployment taxes as well
as back-wage claims.235 The TWC issued abstracts of the assessments,
which placed a hold on the debtor's funding, including receivables paid
by the federal government to the Comptroller, and directed the Comp-
troller to turn over the federal funds to the TWC in partial satisfaction of
the delinquent unemployment taxes and back-wage claims. Thereafter,
the bank sued the TWC asking the court to declare the bank's security
interest superior to the TWC's lien and to order the TWC to reimburse
the bank for the federal funds that the TWC had received on behalf of
the debtor.236
Affirming the trial court, the court of appeals held the TWC was not
protected by sovereign immunity and it had deprived the bank of its right
227. See id. at 86-87.
228. W.H.V., Inc., 43 S.W.3d at 87.
229. Id. at 91.
230. 881 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, no writ).
231. W.H.V., Inc., 43 S.W.3d at 90-91. Perfection of a security interest in a manufac-
tured home is by notation of the security interest on a certificate of title issued by the Texas
Department of Housing and Community Affairs under TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
5221(f), § 19(a)(2)(F) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
232. 40 S.W.3d 690 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, pet. denied).
233. Id. at 692.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 693.
236. Id. at 693-94.
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to property, which constituted a "taking" in violation of the Texas Consti-
tution.237 The bank was entitled to reimbursement of the funds paid to
the TWC because the bank perfected its security interest before the TWC
liens arose, the bank was entitled to reimbursement of the funds paid to
the TWC. 238 The court also approved nullification of the TWC liens until
the bank's superior interest was fully satisfied.2 39
C. ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITY INTERESTS
If all goes well with a secured transaction, the debtor pays the debt, the
security interest is released, and neither the secured party nor the debtor
has any further obligation to the other party. Even if all does not go en-
tirely well and the debtor defaults, the secured party is able to foreclose
on the collateral and realize a sufficient amount from the disposition of
the collateral to pay the balance of the debt without incurring any liability
for a wrongful disposition. Like true love, however, the course of a dispo-
sition is not always smooth, as illustrated by First Valley Bank of Los
Fresnos v. Martin.240 In that case, a debtor borrowed $20,000 from a
creditor using cattle as collateral for the loan. Subsequently, with the per-
mission of the creditor, the debtor sold some of the cattle, and several
years later defaulted on the loan. The creditor foreclosed and sold more
of the cattle.241 A month later, the creditor erroneously notified the sher-
iff's department that the cattle could not be found.242 The debtor was
indicted for hindering a secured creditor but the indictment was ulti-
mately dismissed.243 The debtor sued the creditor for malicious prosecu-
tion, fraud, damages to credit and personal reputation, mental anguish
and loss of earning capacity. The jury awarded the debtor more than
$18,000,000 in actual and exemplary damages.244 The creditor
appealed. 245
The court found that the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain all of
the debtor's claims with the exceptions of fraud and damages to credit
reputation. 246 The primary focus of the opinion was on the issue of mali-
cious prosecution and the associated damages.247 The court held that the
creditor was aware of the presence of the collateral, as evidenced by the
237. MidFirst Bank, 40 S.W.3d at 695-96. TEX. CONsTr. art. I, § 17 forbids the State
from taking, damaging, or destroying a person's property for public use without payment
of adequate compensation.
238. Id. at 698.
239. Id.
240. 55 S.W.3d 172 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, pet. filed).
241. Id. at 179.
242. Id. at 180.
243. Id. at 180. See also TEX. PENAL CoDE ANN. §32.33 (Vernon 1994) which makes it
a criminal offense for a debtor to intentionally hinder a secured party in the enforcement
of a security interest.
244. First Valley Bank, 55 S.W.3d at 180.
245. Id. at 181.
246. Id. at 194.
247. Id. at 189-91.
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authorization of the debtor's sale and by the creditor's own sale.248 Under
these circumstances, the creditor could not have reasonably believed the
cattle were missing when the indictment was filed and, therefore, did not
have probable cause to pursue a criminal prosecution. Furthermore, ac-
cording to the court, the effects of malicious prosecution extended into
both the debtor's private and public life and supported a claim for signifi-
cant actual damage. 249 The court did, however, reverse the trial court
judgment on the claims of fraud and loss of credit reputation due to a
lack of evidence and recalculated the exemplary damages based on the
"damages cap" in the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. 250 Even with
the reversal on the claims of fraud and loss of credit reputation, and with
the reduction in the amount of exemplary damages, the secured party was
still liable for more than four million dollars.
In Riyad Bank v. Tawfic al Gailani,251 the secured party fared some-
what better. In Riyad, a Saudi Arabian bank foreclosed on a debtor's
accounts receivable that secured a two million dollar line of credit and
sold them at a public foreclosure sale.252 The bank itself was the buyer
and purchased the accounts for ten dollars. No attempt was made by the
bank to collect any of the accounts prior to sale.253 Following the sale,
the bank sued three co-signers who had guaranteed the debtor's promis-
sory note for a deficiency of 1.9 million dollars.254 The co-signers con-
tended the bank had violated the standards of commercial reasonableness
required by the Code, in part because the bank had notified the Saudi
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) of the default.2 55 The co-signers ar-
gued that this was an effort to collect the accounts because notice to
SAMA prevented them from obtaining banking services or otherwise
participating in the Saudi business community and effectively destroyed
the value of the collateral.2 56 The trial court entered a summary judg-
ment against the co-signers.2 57 The court of appeals concluded that send-
ing notice of default to SAMA raised fact issues as to whether this was
248. Id. at 184.
249. 55 S.W.3d at 190.
250. Id. at 194. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008 (Vernon 1997) limits
exemplary damages to the greater of $200,000 or two times the amount of economic dam-
ages plus non-economic damages not to exceed $750,000. Applying this limitation, the
court reduced the exemplary damages to $1,470,000.
251. 61 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. 2001).
252. Id. at 354.
253. Id. at 356.
254. Id. at 354-55.
255. Id. at 355. Because the case arose under the former version of Chapter 9, the pro-
visions of the Code considered by the court were TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.502,
.504 & .505 (Vernon 1994). Revised Chapter 9 was adopted in Texas during the 1999 legis-
lative session to become effective on July 1, 2001. See Act of June 18, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S.,
ch. 414, §1.01, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 2639. Several technical amendments were made during
the 2001 legislative session, but the effective date remained the same. See Act of June 13,
2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 705, §§ 1-26 Tex. Gen. Laws 1403 (codified as TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. §§ 9.101-709 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
256. Riyald Bank, 61 S.W.3d at 356.
257. Id. at 355.
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done in an attempt to collect payment and whether giving such notice was
commercially reasonable under section 9.502.258 The court of appeals did
not discuss the sale of collateral issue under section 9.504.259
The Texas Supreme Court, on appeal, reasoned that reporting the de-
fault to SAMA did not amount to the bank's taking control or possession
of the accounts for the purpose of collecting from the account debtors,
but was more akin to credit reporting to an unrelated agency. 260 There
was, therefore, no violation of the commercial reasonableness standard of
section 9.502.261 The court further held, however, that by selling the ac-
counts, the bank did invoke its remedies under section 9.504 and had the
burden of proving it had acted in a commercially reasonable manner.262
Since this issue had not been addressed below, the case was remanded to
the court of appeals to determine if fact issues were raised concerning the
bank's compliance with section 9.504.263
Riyad arose before the effective date of revised Chapter 9, and, there-
fore, the rules applied were those of the former Chapter 9.264 The default
rules have been changed significantly by revised Chapter 9 and the issues
raised in Riyad would now be considered under sections 9.610 and
9.615.265 The focus would now include not only the issue of a commer-
cially reasonable disposition, but also the valuation of the accounts in re-
lation to the amount paid because they were sold to the secured party. 266
258. Id. at 356. The court of appeals decision is reported, sub nom, Gailani v. Riyad
Bank Houston Agency, 22 S.W.3d 560 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2000), reversed, 61 S.W.3d 353
(Tex. 2001).
259. 61 S.W.3d at 356.
260. Id. at 357.
261. Id. at 356-57.
262. Id. at 358.
263. Id. at 359.
264. See supra note 255.
265. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.610, .615 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
266. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.615(f) (Vernon Supp. 2002), which
provides:
(f) The surplus or deficiency following a disposition is calculated based on
the amount of proceeds that would have been realized in a disposition com-
plying with this subchapter to a transferee other than the secured party, a
person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor if:
(1) the transferee in the disposition is the secured party, a person related to
the secured party, or a secondary obligor; and
(2) the amount of proceeds of the disposition is significantly below the range
of proceeds that a complying disposition to a person other than the secured
party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor would
have brought.
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